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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
demand interpretation and construction, processes which are basic
to the very nature of the jurist.
Dym v. Gordon is a "guidepost" case, the first of many whose
clarifications are essential to the precise utilization of the approach
outlined in Babcock. Although, as such, its significance is limited,
it performs well-in providing a direction to be followed and new
impetus for the principle.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POSTAL RESTRICTION OF COMMUNIST
PROPAGANDA Dzmm) INVALm.-The addressees of unsealed mail,
containing "communist political propaganda," originating in a
foreign country, attacked the constitutionality of a federal statute 1
which authorized detention of such mail upon its arrival in the
United States, until a written request for its delivery was made.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the statute
was violative of the first amendment, since its requirement of a
written request to obtain the mail constituted a restriction on the
unfettered exercise of the addressee right to free speech. Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
The freedoms of speech and press, at the time they were
embodied in the Constitution, consisted primarily of immunity from
prior restraints, i.e., censorship.2  Prevention of censorship, how-
ever, was not their exclusive purpose. Any action on the part of the
Government which might prevent free discussion of public matters
was also prohibited,3 thus the unconditional phrasing of the first
amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .
Nevertheless, the first amendment does not protect every utter-
ance; the right to speak is not absolute.4 The right to express
one's views freely, however, has come to enjoy a preferred status.5
1 Postal Serv. and Fed. Employees Salary Act, 39 U.S.C. §4008(a)
(1964).2 Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. Ray.
703, 714 (1938). See generally CHAFEE, FRmom oF SPEEcH (1920).
32 CooLEY, CONsTITUTIONAL LImITATIoNs 886 (8th ed. 1927); Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936).
4 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). For example, the follow-
ing types of speech are not protected by the first amendment: obscenity, Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; "group libel," Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). But see the dissenting opinions
of Mr. Justice Black in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961);
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 415 (1961).
5 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 89 (1949).
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The test used to determine whether speech is of a character which
permits limitation has been stated to be "whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger" -- the evil being that
which the speech advocates. Invasion of the right is justified when
the Government has a "substantial interest" in limiting the speech.
However, the problem is to determine what constitutes a sub-
stantial interest. The courts have attempted to balance the interests
of the Government in the regulation of certain utterances with that
of the individual's interest in disseminating his ideas, in order to
ascertain whether the Government's interest is substantial enough
to warrant restriction of freedom of speech. For example, in
Thomas v. Collins,7 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a state statute requiring labor organizers to register and procure a
card before soliciting members, reasoning that such restriction was
a prior restraint on the exercise of free speech. The Court noted
that although the state had power to regulate labor in the public
interest, it could not trespass on the domains of free speech and
assembly. The state's interest in labor regulation and the prevention
of fraud was not considered substantial enough to warrant the
restriction of speech. However, in Dennis v. United States," the
Court upheld the Smith Act, which prohibited speech advocating
the violent and forcible overthrow of the Government. The Court
indicated there that the Government's interest in internal security
was substantial enough to limit this type of speech.
In a recent elaboration on this "balancing test," the Supreme
Court has indicated that, as a result of the preferred status of
first amendment rights, only a compelling state interest can justify
a statute burdening the exercise of these rights. Moreover, even
if such an interest exists, the onus remains upon the state to prove
that no alternative means would prevent the evil.9 Therefore, any
attempt, direct or indirect, to limit the freedom of speech, without
such a compelling reason, will be an unlawful abridgment of the
constitutional guarantee.10
The question arose early as to what extent Congress' power
to regulate the mails was limited by these standards. In 1878,
the Supreme Court held, in Ex parte Jackson,"1 that the exclusion
6 Dennis v. United States, supra note 4, at 510. The test was a refinement
of the "dear and present danger" test formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7323 U.S. 516 (1945).8 Supra note 4. The Smith Act, however, does not prohibit mere
advocacy or teaching of the violent usurpation of power as an abstract prin-
ciple. The urging of action is a necessary element of the prohibited speech.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
9 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
10 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
12 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 727 (1878).
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of lottery circulars from the mails did not constitute an infringement
on freedom of speech, since the use of the mails was a privilege
granted by Congress and was, therefore, retractable at will. The
Court's decision was based on the assumption that there were other
suitable means of distribution readily available to persons who were
denied the use of the mails. Although this theory was never
directly repudiated by the Supreme Court, many doubts have been
expressed in a succession of judicial opinions 12 concerning its efficacy.
In fact, the Supreme Court itself, in Speiser v. Randall,13 stated
that "Congress may not by withdrawal of mailing privileges place
limitations upon the freedom of speech which if directly attempted
would be unconstitutional." 14
Freedom of speech embraces distribution and circulation of
ideas whether or not they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. 5
On the other hand, it does not always protect utterances which
may constitute a danger to the public. Consequently, political
propaganda advocating the violent overthrow of, or forcible re-
sistance to, the laws of the United States is banned from the mails."'
From 1951 to 1961, however, the Post Office maintained a program
which excluded from the mails other types of political propaganda
in addition to that advocating violent overthrow of the Government. 17
The authority for this action was based on a written opinion of
Attorney General Jackson in 1940, which sanctioned the exclusion
of a large quantity of Nazi propaganda.' Statutory support for
this opinion was found in various provisions of the Espionage Act '19
and the Foreign Agents Registration Act.2 0
n See, e.g., Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ; United States ex rel. Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 430 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 1 CHA.EE, GoVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNI cA oNs 276-86 (1947) ; Deutsch, Freedom of the Press
and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. REv. 703 (1938) ; Note, 28 VA. L. Rav. 634
(1942).
13357 U.S. 513 (1958).
14Id. at 518.
IS See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936) ; see also Note, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 81 (1938).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1717 (1964).
17 See Schwartz & Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails:
A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REv.
621 (1959).
1839 Ops. AnT'Y Gax. 535 (1940).
1940 Stat. 217 (1917).
2052 Stat. 631-33 (1938), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1964). As a result
of the Attorney General's opinion, the act was held to apply to both resident
and non-resident agents of foreign nations. However, the postal authorities
expressed doubt as to the validity of the opinion since the statute was
intended to apply solely to resident agents. (Congress had feared that
Americans would be duped into believing that certain political proposals were
being supported by American organizations.) See H.R. RaP. No. 1381,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
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Thus, the federal government, through the Post Office, under-
took to censor and withhold from American addressees all political
propaganda coming from behind the Iron Curtain, even without
direct congressional authorization.21  Neither the sender nor the
addressees received any notice of such action. In 1958, however,
the Government instituted a new procedure whereby a form note
was sent to each recipient of communist propaganda describing the
item and the reason for its detention. If the addressee desired to
receive the mail he would return the notice with his signature duly
afffxed. 22
In 1961, President Kennedy discontinued this entire admin-
istrative procedure. The program itself had escaped judicial review
throughout this period, no doubt, because few people knew that
the Government had been screening their mail; in addition, under
the 1958 procedure, when individuals complained of the interference
or returned the form, the Post Office would release the detained mail
and would not withhold any subsequent mail of that nature addressed
to them. Moreover, there was much doubt as to whether an ad-
dressee, or a non-resident alien had "standing" to test the legality
of the confiscatory procedure.23  Neither issue had been decided
by the Supreme Court. Congress, in March 1962, enacted the Postal
Service and Federal Employees Salary Act.24  The act was es-
sentially a congressional authorization of the administrative program
which had been discontinued by the President in 1961. In the
instant case, the constitutionality of this statute was attacked by two
addressees. Each had originally instituted separate suits, 25 claiming
that the statute violated his first amendment rights. The communist
literature addressed to one plaintiff, a distributor of pamphlets, was
detained. The other plaintiff, whose communist political propaganda
was similarly detained by the Post Office, was merely a willing
recipient of this type of writing. Both plaintiffs, after notification
of the seizure, refused to respond to the notice sent by the Post
Office and instituted suit. Subsequently, the Post Office notified
them that it considered their action to be an expression of their
21 Postal employees segregated all mail coming from communist countries
and sent it to one of three major post offices. At these segregations centers,
all unsealed mail was screened and all publications deemed to contain
propaganda were detained. When an item was classified as propaganda, it
was either destroyed or forwarded to other governmental agencies. See
Schwartz & Paul, supra note 17, at 623, 648.
22 See Schwartz & Paul, supra note 17, at 647-48, 666.
2 3 Id. at 649.
24 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a) (1964). The procedure provided that the addressee
be notified that communist political propaganda had been received, and would
be delivered only upon his request, except that such detention would not be
made when the recipient manifested a desire to receive such mail.2 5 Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 229 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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desire to receive "communist political propaganda" and that there-
after none of their mail would be detained. A federal district
court held that the addressee could not contest the statute since
his mail would no longer be impeded, rendering the question moot.26
However, the other district court reached the merits, and unanimously
held the statute unconstitutional. 27  In so doing, the court stated
that to render this case moot would be to approve a device which
would effectively preclude any potential recipient from ever testing
the constitutionality of the statute.2
The Supreme Court found that there was not even a "colorable
question" of mootness since a new procedure, introduced subsequent
to the lower court rulings, required a separate request for each
item desired. Therefore, the Court concluded: "The Act as con-
strued and applied is unconstitutional because it requires an official
act (viz., returning the reply card) as a limitation on the unfettered
exercise of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 29
The Court indicated that the use of the mails is "almost as
much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues," 2 0 and
concluded additionally that the obligation imposed on the addressee,
i.e., to request his mail, would have a deterrent effect on individuals
who fear the social disapprobation which might result from sending
for literature which a federal agency has condemned as "communist
political propaganda." Therefore, the "regime of this act is at
war with the 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and dis-
cussion that is contemplated by the First Amendment." 31
The concurring Justices stated that the plaintiff-addressees as-
serted first amendment claims in their own right; the underlying
issue, therefore, was the question of whether the right to receive
publications was included within the protection of the first amend-
ment, as one of those "fundamental personal rights" necessary to
make the express guarantees fully meaningful. While this issue
was not expressly discussed by the majority, it is obvious that
they predicated their decision on this right. Only by such recognition
could they proceed to apply the protection of the first amendment
to the parties bringing suit. Thus, the concurring Justices reasoned
that since the Government did not demonstrate that there existed a
compelling interest to protect the public from this type of prop-
aganda,32 any restriction on the exercise of first amendment freedoms,
26 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., supra note 25.
27 Heilberg v. Fixa, supra note 25.
2s Id. at 407.
29 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 305 U.S. 301, 81 (1965). (Emphasis
added.)
30 Ibid.
3I Id. at 307.
32 On appeal, the Government did not attempt to justify the statute in
terms of "compelling interest." However, the Government had raised, but
failed to prove, "compelling interest" in the lower court. Heilberg v. Fixa,
supra note 25, at 409.
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including a mere inconvenience, was prohibited. The majority
stated: "we cannot sustain an intrusion on First Amendment rights
on the ground that the intrusion is only a minor one." 33
The Court's recognition that the first amendment protects the
rights of an addressee to receive publications will have a consider-
able impact in the area of free speech. In the past, attacks on statutes
imposing regulations on the mails were made primarily by senders;
and, in the area of free speech, it has always been the party seeking
to disseminate his ideas, i.e., the writer, speaker or publisher, as
opposed to the reader or listener, who brought suit. Statutory
provisions dealing with the freedom of speech, or affecting it indirectly,
will now have to be scrutinized, keeping in mind the fact that
prospective addressees now have a constitutional right to receive
the communication.
The decision in Lamnt follows the recent trend of Supreme
Court decisions in expanding the protections of the first amendment
to certain "derivative rights" such as "freedom of association" and
"non-disclosure." 4 The soundness of this policy has been criticized
and it has been suggested that the first amendment should be ap-
plicable only to direct infringement of the enumerated freedoms.35
According to this view these derivative rights should be protected
under the due process clauses of the fifth or fourteenth amendments. 36
It is submitted, however, that it is reasonable and just to con-
sider the right to receive publications as a derivative right, necessary
to render the freedom of speech fully meaningful, and to invoke
the first amendment to prevent its abridgment. "The dissemination
of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are
not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren market-
place of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." 37
The position taken by the Court in Lamont appears to be
a direct repudiation of earlier holdings that the use of the mails was
merely a privilege. In addition, Congress' power to impede, in any
manner, the delivery of communist propaganda of a non-violent
nature to addressees in the United States is severely restricted.
33 Supra note 29, at 309.
34 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), wherein the Supreme
Court invalidated a statute requiring teachers in state-supported schools to file
affidavits each year listing each organization to which they had belonged or
contributed during the past five years; the Court stated that the "teachers'
right of free association . . . [is) a right, which like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society." Id. at 486. In Louisiana v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961), the Court considered a requirement that all members of the
organization living in the state be listed; it was unanimously held an uncon-
stitutional infringement of the members' first amendment rights.
35 Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
167 (1961).
36 Id. at 174-80.
37 Supra note 29, at 308 (concurring opinion).
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However, this is not to say that Congress' hands are tied
in dealing with propaganda of this type. The purpose of the statute
in the instant case was to protect the American people from the
subversive ideas disseminated by this propaganda. This purpose
can just as easily be attained if Congress apprises the citizenry
of the fact that large quantities of propaganda are being introduced
into the United States from abroad, and that all citizens who do
not wish to receive this mail can so notify the Post Office, and have
it detained there.
In conclusion, the principal case indicates the Supreme Court's
growing discontent with indirect governmental interference with
freedom of speech through control of the mails. The case represents
a further judicial extension of first amendment's guarantees and
will provide a precedent for future cases in which petitioners allege
unconstitutional restrictions upon derivative first amendment
rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RIGHT TO TRAVEL - PROHIBITION ON
TRAVEL TO CUBA UPHELD AS VALID AREA RETRICTION.-In com-
pliance with a requirement of the Department of State, the plaintiff
applied for validation of his passport for travel to Cuba. The
request was denied on the ground that it was not in the best interest
of the United States to allow tourist travel to Cuba, and the
plaintiff brought suit against the Secretary of State. In affirming a
special three-judge district court's dismissal of the action, the United
States Supreme Court, on direct appeal,' held that refusal to validate
a passport for travel to Cuba was a proper exercise of power by the
Secretary of State under the Passport Act of 1926, and was not an
unconstitutional deprivation of plaintiff's right to travel. Zernel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
The use of passports and the concept of the right to travel
have distinct histories which did not merge until recent years. The
term passport arose in relation to a privilege afforded an alien or
foreign ambassador to pass safely through the territory of the issuing
sovereign. 2 Later, passports evolved into documents issued to the
citizens of a country, solely for the purpose of identifying the
bearer in order to insure his safety while traveling in foreign
countries.3 It was never a requirement that a traveler obtain a
passport in order to leave the United States.4
'28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
2 Jaffe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FORMGN Ar-
FAms 17 (1956).
3 Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835).
4 Ibid.
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